In predicate encryption, a ciphertext is associated with a descriptive attribute value x in addition to a plaintext µ, a secret key is associated with a predicate f . The decryption returns plaintext µ if and only if f (x) = 1. Moreover, the security guarantees that an adversary learns nothing about the attribute x or the plaintext µ, given arbitrary many secret keys that are not authorized to decrypt individually. We construct a predicate encryption scheme for all circuits, assuming the hardness of the subexponential learning with errors problem. That is, for any polynomial function d = d(λ), we construct a predicate encryption scheme for the class of all circuits with depth bounded by d(λ), where λ is the security parameter. * Privacy guarantees. The privacy notion we achieve is a simulation-based variant of "weak attribute-hiding" from the literature [SBC + 07, OT10, AFV11]. That is, we guarantee privacy of the attribute x and the plaintext µ against collusions holding secret keys for functions f such that f (x) = 0. An even stronger requirement would be to require privacy of x even against authorized keys corresponding to functions f where f (x) = 1. 1 This stronger requirement is equivalent to "full-fledged" functional encryption [BSW11], for which we cannot hope to achieve simulation-based security for all circuits as achieved in this work [BSW11, AGVW13].
Introduction
Predicate encryption [BW07, SBC + 07, KSW08] is a new paradigm for public-key encryption that supports searching on encrypted data. In predicate encryption, ciphertexts are associated with descriptive attribute values x in addition to plaintexts µ, secret keys are associated with a predicate f , and a secret key decrypts the ciphertext to recover µ if and only if f (x) = 1. The security requirement for predicate encryption enforces privacy of x and the plaintext even amidst multiple secret key queries: an adversary holding secret keys for different query predicates learns nothing about the attribute x and the plaintext if none of them is individually authorized to decrypt the ciphertext.
Motivating applications. We begin with several motivating applications for predicate encryption [BW07, SBC + 07]:
• For inspecting log files for network intrusions detection, we would encrypt network flows labeled with a set of attributes from the network header, such as the source and destination addresses, port numbers, time-stamp, and protocol numbers. We could then issue auditors with restricted secret keys that can only decrypt the network flows that fall within a particular range of IP addresses and some specific time period.
• For credit card fraud investigation, we would encrypt credit card transactions labeled with a set of attributes such as time, costs and zipcodes. We could then issue investigators with restricted secret keys that decrypt transactions over $1,000 which took place in the last month and originated from a particular range of zipcodes.
• For anti-terrorism investigation, we would encrypt travel records labeled with a set of attributes such as travel destination and basic traveller data. We could then issue investigators with restricted secret keys that match certain suspicious travel patterns.
• For online dating, we would encrypt personal profiles labeled with dating preferences pertaining to age, height, weight and salary. Secret keys are associated with specific attributes and can only decrypt profiles for which the attributes match the dating preferences.
In all of these examples, it is important that unauthorized parties do not learn the contents of the ciphertexts, nor of the meta-data associated with the ciphertexts, such as the network header or dating preferences. On the other hand, it is often okay to leak the meta-data to authorized parties. We stress that privacy of the meta-data is an additional security requirement provided by predicate encryption but not by the related and weaker notion of attribute-based encryption [SW05, GPSW06] ; the latter only guarantees the privacy of the plaintext µ and not the attribute x.
Utility and expressiveness. The utility of predicate encryption is intimately related to the class of predicates for which we could create secret keys. Ideally, we would like to support the class of all circuits. Over the past decade, substantial advances were made for the weaker primitive of ABE, culminating most recently in schemes supporting any policy computable by general circuits [GVW13, BGG + 14] under the standard LWE assumption [Reg09]. However, the state-of-the-art for predicate encryption is largely limited to very simple functionalities related to computing an inner product [BW07, SBC + 07, KSW08, AFV11].
Our Contributions
In this work, we substantially advance the state of the art to obtain predicate encryption for all circuits (c.f. Figure 1) : Theorem (informal) . Under the LWE assumption, there exists a predicate encryption scheme for all circuits, with succint ciphertexts and secret keys independent of the size of the circuit.
As with prior LWE-based ABE for circuits [GVW13, BGG + 14], to support circuits of depth d, the parameters of the scheme grow with poly(d), and we require sub-exponential n Ω(d) hardness of the LWE assumption. In addition, the security guarantee is selective, but can be extended to adaptive security via complexity leveraging [BB04] . Figure 1 : State of the art in functional encryption. The white region refers to functionalities for which we have constructions under standard cryptographic assumptions like LWE or decisional problems in bilinear groups: these functionalties include inner product encryption (IPE), attribute-based encryption for general circuits (ABE) and predicate encryption for general circuits. The grey region refers to functionalities beyond predicate encryption for which we only have constructions for weaker security notions like bounded collusions, or under non-standard cryptographic assumptions like obfuscation or multilinear maps. scheme with (x, fhe.sk) as the attributes. To generate the predicate secret key for a function f , one simply generates the ABE secret key for the function g that takes as input (x, fhe.sk) and computes g(fhe.sk,x) = FHE.Dec(fhe.sk; FHE.Eval(f,x))
That is, g first homomorphically computes an encryption of f (x), and then decrypts it using the FHE secret key to output f (x). At first glance, this idea evokes strong and conflicting emotions. On the one hand, it seems pointless since the ABE ciphertext reveals the "attributes" (fhe.sk,x), and therefore the plaintext x. However, it also offers hope since the bulk of the computation, namely the homomorphic evaluation of the function f , is performed on inputs fhe.pk andx that we do not mind revealing. The only computation performed on secret values is the FHE decryption which is a fairly lightweight computation. In particular, with all known FHE schemes [Gen09, BV11b, BV11a, BGV12, GSW13, BV14, AP14], decryption corresponds to computing an inner product followed by a threshold function. In other words, if one could enhance ABE with a modicum of secrecy so that it can perform a heavyweight computation on public attributes followed by a lightweight privacy-preserving computation on secret attributes, we are back in business. Our first contribution is to define such an object, that we call partially hiding predicate encryption.
Partially Hiding Predicate Encryption. We introduce the notion of partially hiding predicate encryption (PHPE), an object that interpolates between attribute-based encryption and predicate encryption (analogously to partial garbling in [IW14]). In PHPE, the ciphertext, encrypting message µ, is associated with an attribute (x, y) where x is private but y is always public. The secret key is associated with a function f , and decryption succeeds iff f (x, y) = 1. On the one extreme, considering a dummy x or functions f that ignore x and compute on y, we recover attribute-based encryption. On the other end, considering a dummy y or functions f that ignore y and compute on x, we recover predicate encryption.
We will be interested in realizing PHPE for functions φ of the form φ(x, y) = g(x, h(y)) for some functions g and h where h may perform arbitrary heavy-weight computation on the public y and g only performs lightweight computation on the private x. Mapping back to our discussion, we would like to achieve PHPE for the "evaluate-then-decrypt" class of functions, namely where g is the FHE decryption function, h is the FHE evaluation function, x is the FHE secret key, and y is the FHE ciphertext. In general, we would like g to be simple and will allow h to be complex. It turns out that we can formalize the observation above, namely that PHPE for this class of functions gives us a predicate encryption scheme. The question now becomes: can we construct PHPE schemes for the "evaluate-then-decrypt" class of functions?
Assuming the subexponential hardness of learning with errors (LWE), we show how to construct a partially hiding predicate encryption for the class of functions f :
This is almost what we want, but not quite. Recall that FHE decryption in many recent schemes [BV11b, BGV12, GSW13, BV14, AP14] is a function that checks whether an inner product of two vectors in Z t q (one of which could be over {0, 1} t ) lies in a certain range. Indeed, if z ∈ {0, 1} t is an encryption of 1 and x ∈ Z t q is the secret key, we know that x, z ∈ [q/2 − B, q/2 + B] (mod q), where B is the noise range. Applying the so-called "modulus reduction" [BV11b] transformation to all these schemes, we can assume that this range is polynomial in size.
In other words, we will manage to construct a partially hiding PE scheme for the function
whereas we need a partially hiding PE scheme for the FHE decryption function which is
where R is the polynomial size range [q/2 − B, q/2 + B] from above. How do we reconcile this disparity?
The "Lazy OR" Trick. The solution, called the "lazy OR trick" [SBC + 07, GMW14] is to publish secret keys for all functions f γ for γ ∈ R := [q/2−B, q/2+B]. This will indeed allow us to test if the FHE decryption of the evaluated ciphertext is 1 (and reveal the message µ if it is), but it is also worrying. Publishing these predicate secret keys for the predicates f γ reveals more information than whether x, h(y) ? ∈ R. In particular, it reveals what x, h(y) is. This means that an authorized key would leak partial information about the attribute, which we do allow for predicate encryption. On the other hand, for an unauthorized key where the FHE decryption is 0, each of these f γ , γ ∈ R is also an unauthorized key in the PHPE and therefore leaks no information about the attribute. This extends to the collection of keys in R since the PHPE is secure against collusions. For simplicity, we assume in the rest of this overview that FHE decryption corresponds to exactly to inner product.
Asymmetry to the Rescue: Constructing Partially Hiding PE. Our final contribution is the construction of a partially hiding PE for the function class f γ (x, y) above. We do this using the fully keyhomomorphic encryption techniques developed by Boneh et al [BGG + 14] in the context of constructing an "arithmetic" ABE scheme. The crucial observation about the ABE scheme of [BGG + 14] is that while it was not designed to hide the attributes, it can be made to partially hide them in exactly the way we want. In particular, the scheme allows us to carry out an inner product of a public attribute vector (corresponding to the evaluated FHE ciphertext) and a private attribute vector (corresponding to the FHE secret key fhe.ct), thanks to an inherent asymmetry in homomorphic evaluation of ABE ciphertexts. In the proof of security, we rely on techniques from inner product predicate encryption [AFV11] to prove the privacy of x. Note that in the latter, the inner product is computed over a vector in the ciphertext and one in the key, whereas in our scheme, the inner product is computed over two vectors in the ciphertext. We refer the reader to Section 3 for the detailed overview of the construction.
Discussion
Comparison with other approaches. The two main alternative approaches for realizing predicate and functional encryption both rely on multi-linear maps either implicitly, or explicitly. The first is to use indistinguishability obfuscation as in [GGH + 13b] , and the second is to extend the dual system encryption framework to multi-linear maps [Wat09]. A crucial theoretical limitation of these approaches is that they all rely on non-standard assumptions; we have few candidates for multi-linear maps [GGH13a, CLT13, GGH14] and the corresponding assumptions are presently poorly understood and not extensively studied in cryptanalysis, and in some cases, broken [CHL + 14]. In particular, the latest attack in [CHL + 14] highlight the importance of obtaining constructions and developing techniques that work under standard cryptographic assumptions, as is the focus of this work.
Barriers to functional encryption from LWE. We note the two main barriers to achieving full-fledged functional encryption from LWE using our framework. First, the lazy conjunction approach to handle threshold inner product for FHE decryption leaks the exact inner product and therefore cannot be used to achieve full attribute-hiding. Second, we do not currently know of a fully attribute-hiding inner product encryption scheme under the LWE assumption, although we do know how to obtain such schemes under standard assumptions in bilinear groups [OT12, KSW08].
Preliminaries
We refer the reader to Section A for notation and lattice preliminaries.
Fully-Homomorphic Encryption
We present a fairly minimal instantiation of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) from LWE which is sufficient for our constructions. A leveled homomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms (HE.KeyGen, HE.Enc, HE.Eval, HE.Dec). The reader is refereed to Section A.3 for the standard correctness and security semantics of these algorithms. We will rely on an instantiation of FHE from the LWE assumption. • HE.KeyGen outputs a secret key sk ∈ Z t q where t = poly(λ);
• HE.Enc outputs a ciphertext ct ∈ {0, 1} where = poly(k, d, λ, log q);
• HE.Eval outputs a ciphertext ct ∈ {0, 1} t ;
• for any boolean circuit of depth d, HE.Eval(C, ·) is computed by a boolean circuit of depth poly(d, λ, log q).
• HE.Dec on input sk, ct outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If ct is an encryption of 1 then
for some fixed B = poly(λ). Otherwise, if ct is an encryption of 0, then
• security relies on dLWE Θ(t),q,χ .
We highlight several properties of the above scheme: (1) the ciphertext is a bit-string, (2) the bound B is a polynomial independent of q (here, we crucially exploit the new results in [BV14] together with the use of bootstrapping), (3) the size of normal ciphertexts is independent of the size of the circuit (this is the typical compactness requirement).
Partially Hiding Predicate Encryption

Definitions
We introduce the notation of partially hiding predicate encryption (PHPE), which interpolates attribute-based encryption and predicate encryption (analogously to partial garbling in [IW14]). In PHPE, the ciphertext, encrypting message µ, is associated with an attribute (x, y) where x is private but y is always public. The secret key is associated with a predicate C, and decryption succeeds iff C(x, y) = 1. The requirement is that a collusion learns nothing about (x, µ) if none of them is individually authorized to decrypt the ciphertext. Attribute-based encryption corresponds to the setting where x is empty, and predicate encryption corresponds to the setting where y is empty. We refer the reader to Section B for the standard notion of predicate encryption.
Looking ahead to our construction, we show how to:
• construct PHPE for a restricted class of circuits that is "low complexity" with respect to x and allows arbitrarily polynomial-time computation on y;
• bootstrap this PHPE using FHE to obtain PE for all circuits.
Syntax.
A Partially-Hiding Predicate Encryption scheme PHPE for a pair of input-universes X , Y, a predicate universe C, a message space M, consists of four algorithms (PH.Setup, PH.Enc, PH.Keygen, PH.Dec):
The setup algorithm gets as input the security parameter λ and a description of (X , Y, C, M) and outputs the public parameter ph.mpk, and the master key ph.msk.
PH.Enc(ph.mpk, (x, y), µ) → ct y . The encryption algorithm gets as input ph.mpk, an attribute (x, y) ∈ X × Y and a message µ ∈ M. It outputs a ciphertext ct y .
PH.Keygen(ph.msk, C) → sk C . The key generation algorithm gets as input ph.msk and a predicate C ∈ C. It outputs a secret key sk C .
PH.Dec((sk C , C), (ct y , y)) → µ. The decryption algorithm gets as input the secret key sk C , a predicate C, and a ciphertext ct y and the public part of the attribute y. It outputs a message µ ∈ M or ⊥.
Correctness. We require that for all PH.
where the probabilities are taken over sk C ← PH.Keygen(ph.msk, C), ct y ← PH.Enc(ph.mpk, (x, y), µ) and coins of PH.Setup. 
We say an adversary A is admissible if all oracle queries that it makes C ∈ C satisfy C(x, y) = 0. The Partially-Hiding Predicate Encryption scheme PHPE is then said to be attribute-hiding if there is a p.p.t. simulator S such that for every stateful p.p.t. adversary A, the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
Remarks. We point out some remarks of our definition when treated as a regular predicate encryption (i.e. the setting where y is empty) and how it compares to other definitions in the literature in Section B.1.
Our Construction
Overview
We construct a partially hiding predicate encryption for the class of predicate circuits C :
We refer to circuit IP as the generic innerproduct circuit of two vectors.
Looking ahead, C corresponds to FHE evaluation of an arbitrary circuit C, whereas IP γ corresponds to roughly to FHE decryption; in the language of the introduction in Section 1, C corresponds to heavy-weight computation h, whereas IP γ corresponds to light-weight computation g.
The scheme. The public parameters are matrices
An encryption corresponding to the attribute (x, y) ∈ Z t q × {0, 1} is a GPV ciphertext (an LWE sample) corresponding to the matrix
To decrypt the ciphertext given y and a key for C • IP γ , we apply the BGGHNSVV algorithm to first transform the first part of the ciphertext into a GPV ciphertext corresponding to the matrix
Therefore, given only the public matrices and y (but not x), we may transform the ciphertext into a GPV ciphertext corresponding to the matrix
The secret key corresponding to C • IP γ is essentially a "short basis" for the matrix
which can be sampled using a short trapdoor T of the matrix A.
Proof strategy. There are two main components to the proof. Fix the selective challenge attribute x, y. First, we need to simulate secret keys without knowing the trapdoor for the matrix A: here, we rely on the simulated key generation for the ABE [BGG + 14]. Roughly speaking, we will need to generate a short basis for the matrix
where R C • IP is a small-norm matrix known to the simulator. Now, whenever C • IP(x, y) = γ as is the case for admissible adversaries, we will be able to simultae secret keys using the puncturing techniques in [ABB10, AFV11, MP12] Next, we need to show that the attribute x is hidden in the challenge ciphertext. Here, we adopt the proof strategy for attribute-hiding inner product encryption in [AFV11, GMW14] . In the proof, we simulate the matrices A,
and the corresponding terms in the challenge ciphertext are given by:
where c is a uniformly random vector, which we switched from A T s + e using the LWE assumption. Moreover, the secret keys are sampled using T and do not leak any information about R 1 , . . . , R t . We may then invoke the left-over hash lemma to argue that x is information-theoretically hidden.
Auxiliary evaluation algorithms
In order to formally describe our scheme, we first need to recall two algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct ) from the BGGHNSVV14 ABE [BGG + 14], which we may use as a "black box" and then extend to our setting. Given a boolean predicate C : {0, 1} → {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} , the algorithm Eval ct transforms a GPV ciphertext for the matrix
where the matrix A C is deterministically derived from (C, A 1 , . . . , A ) via Eval pk . We then extend Eval pk , Eval ct to handle circuits C • IP as outlined above, with the additional property that Eval ct is oblivious to x. That is, Eval ct transforms a GPV ciphertext for the matrix
Eval pk , and where Eval ct gets y but not x.
Two basic algorithms. The BGGHNSVV14 ABE provides two deterministic algorithms Eval pk , Eval ct with the following properties:
• Eval pk takes as input matrices
• Eval ct takes as input A 1 , . . . , A and C as before, along with y ∈ {0, 1} and vectors u 1 , . . . , u ∈ Z m q , outputs a vector u C ∈ Z m q . The algorithms satisfy the following properties:
. . , R are small-norm matrices, then
we have
where R C is also a small-norm matrix with a roughly n 2d multiplicative blow-up.
These two properties are formalized quantitatively in the following lemma:
The algorithms Eval pk , Eval ct satisfy the following properties. For all
, then we have
where R C is efficiently computable given (C, A, R 1 , . . . , R ) and
Extension to C • IP. We extend the above algorithms to obtain the circuits of the form C • IP. Let C i denote the circuit computing the i'th bit of C.
• Eval pk takes as input +t matrices A 1 , . . . , A , B 1 , . . . , B t ∈ Z n×m q and a circuit C • IP : {0, 1} ×Z t q → Z q , outputs a matrix A C • IP ∈ Z n×m q computed as follows:
• Eval ct takes as input A 1 , . . . , A , B 1 , . . . , B t and C • IP as before, along with y ∈ {0, 1} and + t vectors u 1 , . . . , u , v 1 , . . . , v t ∈ Z m q , outputs a vector u C • IP ∈ Z m q computed as follows:
We stress that Eval ct does not get x. We obtain the following extension of Lemma 3.1:
Lemma 3.2 (properties of extended Eval pk , Eval ct ). The algorithms Eval pk , Eval ct satisfy the following properties. For all 
Proof. The proof follows readily from Lemma 3.1, along with the calculation
We refer the reader to Section C for the formal description of our construction, correctness and security proof.
Predicate Encryption for Circuits
In this section, we present our main construction of predicate encryption for circuits by bootstrapping on top of the partially-hiding predicate encryption. That is,
• We construct a Predicate Encryption scheme PE = (Setup, Keygen, Enc, Dec) for boolean predicate family C bounded by depth d over k bit inputs.
starting from
• an FHE scheme FHE = (HE.KeyGen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec, HE.Eval) with properties as described in Section 2.1. Define as the size of the initial ciphertext encrypting k bit messages, and t as the size of the FHE secret key and evaluated ciphertext vectors;
• a partially-hiding predicate encryption scheme PHPE = (PH.Setup, PH.Keygen, PH.Enc, PH.Dec) for the class C PHPE of predicates bounded by some depth parameter d = poly(d, λ, log q). Recall that
Overview. At a high level, the construction proceeds as follows:
• the PE ciphertext corresponding to an attribute a ∈ {0, 1} k is a PHPE ciphertext corresponding to an attribute (fhe.sk, fhe.ct) where fhe.sk $ ← Z t q is private and fhe.ct := HE.Enc(a) ∈ {0, 1} is public;
• the PE secret key for a predicate C :
where C is a circuit of depth at most d = poly(d, λ, log q);
• decryption works by trying all possible 2B + 1 secret keys.
Note that the construction relies crucially on the fact that B (the bound on the noise in the FHE evaluated ciphertexts) is polynomial. For correctness, observe that for all C, a:
C(a) = 1 ⇔ HE.Dec(fhe.sk, HE.Eval(C, fhe.ct)) = 1
where fhe.sk, fhe.ct,Ĉ are derived from C, a as in our construction. We refer the reader to Section D for the formal description of our construction and security proof.
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A Preliminaries
Notation. Let PPT denote probabilistic polynomial-time. For any integer q ≥ 2, we let Z q denote the ring of integers modulo q and we represent Z q as integers in (−q/2, q/2]. We let Z n×m q denote the set of n × m matrices with entries in Z q . We use bold capital letters (e.g. A) to denote matrices, bold lowercase letters (e.g. x) to denote vectors. The notation A T denotes the transpose of the matrix A.
If A 1 is an n×m matrix and A 2 is an n×m matrix, then [A 1 A 2 ] denotes the n×(m+m ) matrix formed by concatenating A 1 and A 2 . A similar notation applies to vectors. When doing matrix-vector multiplication we always view vectors as column vectors.
We say a function f (n) is negligible if it is O(n −c ) for all c > 0, and we use negl(n) to denote a negligible function of n. We say f (n) is polynomial if it is O(n c ) for some c > 0, and we use poly(n) to denote a polynomial function of n. We say an event occurs with overwhelming probability if its probability is 1 − negl(n). The function lg x is the base 2 logarithm of x. The notation x denotes the nearest integer to x, rounding towards 0 for half-integers.
A.1 Lattice Preliminaries
A.1.1 Learning With Errors (LWE) Assumption
The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [Reg09], who showed that solving it on the average is as hard as (quantumly) solving several standard lattice problems in the worst case.
Definition A.1 (LWE). For an integer q = q(n) ≥ 2 and an error distribution χ = χ(n) over Z q , the learning with errors problem dLWE n,m,q,χ is to distinguish between the following pairs of distributions: Regev and Peikert [Reg09, Pei09] showed that solving dLWE n,m,q,χ is as hard as (quantumly) approximating certain worst case lattice problems to a factor ofÕ(n · q/B), for some B-bounded distribution χ. These lattices problems are believed to be hard to approximate even when q/B is 2 n for some fixed 0 < < 1/2. The hardness of dLWE depends on the modulus-to-noise ratio q/B -the smaller the ratio, the harder the problem. Throughout this paper, the parameter m = poly(n), in which case we will shorten the notation slightly to LWE n,q,χ .
A.2 Lattices Algorithms
Gaussian distributions. Let D Z m ,σ be the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Z m with parameter σ, that is, we replace the output by 0 whenever the || · || ∞ norm exceeds
There is an efficient randomized algorithm TrapSamp(1 n , 1 m , q) that, given any integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and sufficiently large m = Ω(n log q), outputs a parity check matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a 'trapdoor' matrix T ∈ Z m×m such that the distribution of A is negl(n)-close to uniform.
Moreover, there is an efficient algorithm SampleD that with overwhelming probability over all random choices, does the following: For any u ∈ Z n q , and large enough s = Ω( √ n log q), the randomized algorithm SampleD(A, T, u, s) outputs a vector r ∈ Z m with norm ||r|| ∞ ≤ ||r|| 2 ≤ s √ n (with probability 1). Furthermore, the following distributions of the tuple (A, T, U, R) are within negl(n) statistical distance of each other for any polynomial k ∈ N:
Lemma A.2. Suppose that m ≥ (n+1) log q +ω(log n) and that q ≥ 2 is square free. Let R be an m×k matrix chosen uniformly from {−1, 1} m×k mod q where k = k(n) is polynomial in n. Let A and B be matrices chosen uniformly in Z n×m and Z n×k respectively. Then for all vectors w ∈ Z m , the distribution (A, AR, R T w) is statistically close to distribution (A, B, R T w).
We will use the following algorithms to sample short vectors from specific lattices. Looking ahead, the algorithm SampleLeft [ABB10, CHKP12] will be used to sample keys in the real system, while the algorithm SampleRight [ABB10] will be used to sample keys in the simulation.
Algorithm SampleLeft (A, B, T A , u, α) :
, a vector u ∈ Z n q , and a Gaussian parameter α.
(1)
Output: Let F := (A B) . The algorithm outputs a vector e ∈ Z m+m1 in the coset Λ F+u . Where T refers to the norm of Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation of T. We refer the readers to [ABB10] for more details. Often the matrix R given to the algorithm as input will be a random matrix in {1, −1} m×m . Let S m be the m-sphere {x ∈ R m+1 : x = 1}. We define s R := R := sup x∈S m−1 R · x . 
A.2.1 Primitive matrix
We use the primitive matrix G ∈ Z n×m q defined in [MP12]. This matrix has a trapdoor T G such that
We also define an algorithm B −1 : Z n×m q → Z m×m q which deterministically derives a short pre-image A satisfying B · A = A. From [MP12], there exists a way to get A such that A ∈ {0, 1} m×m .
A.3 Fully-Homomorphic Encryption
We present a fairly minimal definition of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) which is sufficient for our constructions. A leveled homomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms (HE.KeyGen, HE.Enc, HE.Eval, HE.Dec):
• Key generation. HE. KeyGen(1 λ , 1 d , 1 k ) is a probablistic algorithm that takes as input the security parameter λ, a depth bound d and message length k and outputs a secret key sk.
• Encryption. HE.Enc(sk, µ) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input sk and a message µ ∈ {0, 1} k and outputs a ciphertext ct.
• Homomorphic evaluation. HE.Eval(f, ct) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a boolean circuit C : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} of depth at most d and a ciphertext ct and outputs another ciphertext ct .
• Decryption. HE.Dec(sk, ct ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input sk and ciphertext ct and outputs a bit.
Correctness. We require perfect decryption correctness with respect to homomorphically evaluated ciphertexts: namely for all λ, d, k and all sk ← HE. KeyGen(1 λ , 1 d , 1 where the probablity is taken over HE.Enc and HE.KeyGen.
Security. We require semantic security for a single ciphertext: namely for every stateful p.p.t. adversary A and for all d, k = poly(λ), the following quantity
is negligible in λ.
B Predicate Encryption
We present the definitions of predicate encryption for general circuits [BW07, KSW08, AFV11]. A predicate encryption scheme PE with respect to an attribute universe A, predicate universe C and a message universe M consists of four algorithms (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec):
Setup(1 λ ) → (mpk, msk). The setup algorithm gets as input the security parameter λ and outputs the public parameter mpk, and the master key msk.
Enc(mpk, a, µ) → ct. The encryption algorithm gets as input mpk, an attribute a ∈ A and a message µ ∈ M. It outputs a ciphertext ct.
KeyGen(msk, C) → sk C . The key generation algorithm gets as input msk and a predicate C ∈ C. It outputs a secret key sk C .
Dec((sk C , C), ct) → µ. The decryption algorithm gets as input sk C and a ciphertext ct. It outputs a message µ.
Correctness. We require that for all (a, C) ∈ A × C such that C(a) = 1 and all µ ∈ M, where the probability is taken over (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1 λ ) and the coins of Enc, KeyGen.
In this work, we focus on the predicate family specified by a boolean circuits bounded by depth d, which is implicitly known to all of the algorithms of the scheme. We say an adversary A is admissible if for all oracle queries that it makes C ∈ C, C(a) = 0. The Predicate Encryption scheme PE is then said to be selectively simulation-secure if there is a p.p.t. simulator S such that for every stateful p.p.t. adversary A, the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
B.1 Security Model
exp real PE,A (1 λ ) λ∈N c ≈ exp ideal PE,S (1 λ ) λ∈N
Remarks on our Definition
• First, we distinguish between two notions of indistinguishability-based definitions used in the literature: weak-indistinguishability and strong-indistinguishability [BW07, SBC + 07, KSW08, AFV11]. In the weak-indistinguishability, the adversary should not be able to distinguish between two pairs of attributes/messages given that it is restricted to queries which do not allow to decrypt (See Section B.3). Our simulation definition is stronger than weak-indistinguishability.
• On top of what is guaranteed by weak-indistinguishability, strong-indistinguishability ensures that adversary cannot distinguish between attributes if it asked for a query that allows to decrypt (in this case, it must output µ 0 = µ 1 ). Our definition is weaker than strong-indistinguishability, since we explicitly restrict the adversary to queries that do not allow to decrypt.
• In the context of arbitrary predicates, strong definitions (both simulation and indistinguishability) are equivalent to security notions for functional encryption (the simulation definition must be adjusted to give the simulated the outputs of the queries). However, this strong-simulation notion is impossible to realize [BSW11, AGVW13] . We refer the reader to Section B.2 for a sketch of the impossibility. Hence, we achieve the best-possible simulation security for predicate encryption (note that in our definition, simulator implicitly knows the outputs of the predicates since it is defined wrt to a restricted (admissible) adversaries). The only problem which we leave open is to realize strong-indistinguishability from standard LWE.
• Our definition for a single message composes to multiple messages setting (see Section B.2).
• Furthermore, it is possible to bootstrap selectively-secure scheme to full security using standard complexity leveraging arguments [BB04, GVW13].
B.2 Relations to Other Security Models
Single Message Implies Many Message Security. We point out a simple composition result for our definition. The definition for many message security remains virtually identical, except the adversary declares a list of tuples (a i , µ i ) for which it sees either real or simulated ciphertexts. Given a one-message simulator S 1 , we can construct a many message simulator S m which just invokes the the one-message simulator to simulate each ciphertext independently. The security follows via the standard hybrid argument and crucially relies on the fact that the adversary is restricted to queries that do not allow to decrypt. Similar result follows for partially hiding predicate encryption.
Impossibility of Strong-Simulation Security
We point out the many-message strong-simulation security is impossible to realize. In the strong-simulation security, the adversary is allowed to query for secret keys that allow to decrypt. The simulator is given the result oracle access to functionality that returns the outputs of the predicates. 
Where the oracles are defines as:
In words, it returns the results of the decryption queries that the adversary should learn by the correctness of the scheme.
• O (msk, C): is the second stage of the simulator, namely S O(·) (msk). It is given access to the same oracle that returns results of the decryption queries that must be satisfied by the correctness.
We say the simulator is admissible if it queries its oracle O(·) on the identical ordered set of queries issued by A. The Predicate Encryption scheme PE is then said to be selectively strong-simulation-secure for manymessages if there is an admissible stateful p.p.t. simulator S such that for every admissible stateful p.p.t. adversary A, the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
The impossibility of this notion follows from the compression arguments of [BSW11, AGVW13] . In particular, consider an adversary that outputs a random list of messages − → µ and arbitrary identities − → a .
It sets the lengths of these lists to be much greater than the length of secret keys of the scheme. Then, upon receiving the challenge ciphertext, it asks for a query that allows to decrypt all messages. The simulator, on the other side, must first commit to a long string − → ct and then later fake a short secret key that must decrypt the entire ciphertext correctly, which is impossible by the standard information theoretic argument.
B.3 Indistinguishability Security of PE
For comparison, we include here the indistinguishability-based formulation of selective, weakly attribute-hiding predicate encryption.
Definition B.3 (Indistinguishability Security). For a stateful adversary A, we define the advantage function
with the restriction that all queries C that A makes to KeyGen(msk, ·) satisfies C(x 0 ) = C(x 1 ) = 0 (that is, sk C does not decrypt ct). A predicate encryption scheme is selectively secure if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage Adv PE A (λ) is a negligible function in λ.
C Our PHPE scheme
• PH.Setup 1 λ , 1 t , 1 , 1 d : The setup algorithm takes the security parameter λ, the length of the secret attribute t, the length of the public attribute , and the circuit depth bound d. Define the lattice parameters n = n(λ), m = m(n, d), q = q(n, d), χ = χ(n) as per Section C.3. • PH.Keygen ph.msk, C • IP γ : The key-generation algorithms takes as input the master secret key msk, a circuit C • IP γ . It outputs a secret key sk C • IPγ computed as follows.
Choose random matrices
Let
be the homomorphically computed "public key" as per the evaluation algorithm in Section 3.2.2. 
Sample a matrix
4. For all i = 1, . . . , t compute an encoding
Output the ciphertext
• PH.Dec((sk C • IPγ , C • IP γ ), (ct y , y)) : The decryption algorithm takes as input the secret key sk C • IPγ for a circuit C • IP γ and the ciphertext ct y along with the public attribute y. It proceeds as follows. 
Otherwise, output ⊥.
C.1 Analysis and Correctness
Lemma C.1. Let C be a family of circuits bounded by depth d and let PHPE be our scheme defined above. Assume that for LWE dimension n = n(λ), the parameters are instantiated as follows:
Then, the scheme is correct according to Definition 3.1.
Proof. We proceed proving correctness of the scheme in two steps. First, we bound the error term e in the final homomorphically computed encoding u C • IP . By Lemma 3.2, the error in u C • IP satisfies
After multiplying by R T , we obtain the final error bound of O(tB · O(n log q) O(d+1) ). We then consider two cases:
• if x, C(y) = γ mod q, then
in the first m − 1 entries for sufficiently large q =Õ(tnd) O(d) . Hence, the message µ is recovered correctly.
• Otherwise, say x, C(y) = γ = γ mod q and γ = γ + γ * . Then, then multiplying by
for some error vector e * . Hence, with all but negligible probability all first m − 1 coefficients of η will be below q/4.
This concludes the correctness proof.
C.2 Security
• PH.Keygen * 1 ph.msk, C • IP γ : The key-generation algorithms takes as input the master secret key ph.msk, a pair of circuits C, IP γ . It outputs a secret key sk C • IPγ computed as follows.
Let
be the homomorphically computed "public key" as per the evaluation algorithm in Section 3.2.2.
By Lemma 3.2,
Now, an admissible adversary is restricted to queries on circuits C • IP γ such that x, C(y) = γ. Hence, we can sample R ∈ Z 2m×m q such that
3. Output the secret key sk C • IPγ := (R).
• PH.Enc * 1 ph.mpk, (x, y), µ : The encryption algorithm takes as input the public key ph.mpk, challenge vectors x ∈ Z t q , y ∈ Z q and a message µ. It computes ciphertext ct y as follows. 
3. For all i = 1, . . . , t compute an encoding
Output the ciphertext Proof. The proof follows closely to [AFV11, Lemma 4.3] . For completeness, we first summarize the difference between the two hybrids:
1. In Hybrid 0, matrices A i , B i are uniformly chosen in Z n×m q . However, in Hybrid 1, We now argue that the joint distribution of the public parameters, the ciphertext and the secret keys
is statistically indistinguishable between the two hybrids. Note that the secret keys are produced in both using trapdoor T and the public matrices. Now, observe that by Lemma A.2,
This holds for matrices B i as well. And since for all i, R i (resp. R i ) is randomly and independently chosen, it follows that
The ciphertext components u i and v i are derived simply by adding (A i + y[i] · G) T s and (B i + x[i] · G) T s to R T i e and (R i ) T e, respectively. And the secret keys are generated from the matrices and the trapdoor T. Since applying a function to two statistically indistinguishable distributions produces two statistically indistinguishable distributions, this shows that the public parameters, the ciphertext and the secret keys are statistically close in both hybrids.
Lemma C.4. The output of Hybrid 1 is statistically indistinguishable from the output of Hybrid 2.
Proof. From Hybrid 1 to Hybrid 2, we switch between between Keygen and PH.Keygen * . Fix a secret key query C • IP γ made by an admissible adversary:
• In Hybrid 1, the secret key is sampled using SampleLeft with trapdoor T, and its distribution only depends on the public matrices in ph.mpk by Theorem A.3 (provided the parameter s is sufficiently large);
• In Hybrid 2, the secret key is sampled using SampleRight with trapdoor T G along with R i , R i (which we can do since the adversary is admissible) and its distribution only depends on the public matrices in ph.mpk by Theorem A.4 (again, provided s is sufficiently large).
In particular, in both hybrids, the distribution of the secret key only depends on the matrices A, A C • IP +γ·G, P and are in turn completely determined by ph.mpk. Since ph.mpk has exactly the same distribution in Hybrids 1 and 2, it follows that the output of both hybrids are statistically indistinguishable.
Lemma C.5. The output of Hybrid 2 is computationally indistinguishable from the output of Hybrid 3, under the LWE assumption.
Proof. We show how to break the security of LWE given an adversary that distinguishes between the two hybrids. We are given matrices (A, P) ∈ Z n×m q × Z n×m q and samples u, w ∈ Z m q × Z m q which are either LWE samples for some secret vector s or randomly chosen. We simulate the experiments as follows.
• Runs PH.Setup * 1 , PH.Keygen * 1 algorithms using the matrices A, P from the challenge.
• To simulate the ciphertext encodings, let β 0 = u and β 1 = w + b, where b = 0, . . . , 0, q/2 µ T ∈ Z m q . The ciphertext encodings u i , v i are computed using R i , R i as
, y, β 0 , β 1
Now clearly, if u = A T s + e and w = P T s + e , then the simulation is identical to Hybrid 2. Otherwise, if u, w are random elements then the experiment corresponds exactly to Hybrid 3. Hence, given an adversary that distinguishes between Hybrids 2 and 3, we can break the security of the standard LWE problem.
D Our Predicate Encryption scheme
Our construction proceeds as follows:
• Setup(1 λ , 1 k , 1 d ): The setup algorithm takes the security parameter λ, the attribute length k and the predicate depth bound d.
1. Run the partially-hiding PE scheme for family C PHPE to obtain a pair of master public and secret keys:
(ph.mpk, ph.msk) ← PH. Setup(1 λ , 1 t , 1 , 1 d ) 2. Output (mpk := ph.mpk, msk := ph.msk).
• Keygen(msk, C):
The key-generation algorithms takes as input the master secret key msk and a predicate C. It outputs a secret key sk C computed as follows.
